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Cognitive Processes Underlying  
Play and Pretend Play:
A Comparative Cross-Species Study 
on Degrees of Memory, Perception, 
Imagination, and Consciousness 
•
Alejandra Wah
Drawing on evolutionary theory, the author questions which cognitive pro-
cesses underlie the capacities to play and to pretend play and the degree to 
which they are present in both humans and nonhuman animals. Consider-
ing cognitive capacities not all-or-nothing phenomena, she argues they are 
present in varying degrees in a wide range of species. Recognizing the risks 
involved in comparative studies, she identifies the unique features of cog-
nition underlying pretend play while describing the broader phylogenetic 
sources from which they come. In the end, she finds, although play based on 
particular degrees of memory, perception, and consciousness can be found 
in many species, pretend play depends on distinctive degrees of memory, 
imagination, and metacognition—a cognitive process she calls “reflective 
imagination”—and appears characteristically human. Keywords: conscious-
ness; imagination; memory; metacognition; perception; play; pretend play; 
reflective imagination
Introduction
In other works, I have argued that distinctive degrees of imagination and 
consciousness—a cognitive process I refer to as “reflective imagination”—under-
lies the artistic experience. I take artistic experience to be the universal and 
characteristically human capacity to experience oneself or others in a narrative 
by means of music, dance, song, pantomime, drawing, pretend play, or verbal 
language (Wah 2017, 2019). 
To analyze this human narrative capacity I have drawn on a theory pro-
posed by Francesco Ferretti and colleagues (2017). They postulate that the cog-
nitive mechanisms underlying the human narrative ability are global coherence 
(the capacity to relate events causally) and a triadic system consisting of mental 
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space travel (the capacity to imagine different spatial locations); mental time 
travel (the capacity to imagine oneself or others at different times, distinguish-
ing between past, present, and future); and mental mind travel (the capacity to 
attribute mental states to oneself or others, also referred to as mind reading or 
theory of mind). The fact that the triadic system of mental space travel, mental 
time travel, and mental mind travel exists, to some extent, in nonhuman animals 
suggests that it precedes verbal language. 
Building on evolutionary theory, I here focus on pretend play and on one 
of the three imaginative capacities—mental time travel. For our purposes, play 
includes locomotor-rotational play (jumping, leaping, twisting, swinging, swirl-
ing, running, climbing), social play (hiding, chasing, fleeing, and rough-and-
tumble play, such as wrestling, grappling, fighting), and object play (carrying, 
dropping, biting, mouthing, manipulating, building), whereas pretend play 
includes role playing and sociodramatic play, both of which involve rehearsal 
of skill, mime, and nonlinguistic gesture and may or may not involve verbal 
language (Burghardt 2010; Donald 2013). 
So far, research has proven that play is common among many nonhuman 
animals, both vertebrates and invertebrates. Play is not ubiquitous in placental 
mammals, but is certainly widespread. To at least some degree, it has been found 
in almost every order. Most groups of eutherian mammals exhibit play in the 
three categories I mentioned (locomotor-rotational play, social play, and object 
play). If only two play types are present, they are usually locomotor-rotational 
and social, which suggests that object play may have a different set of facilitat-
ing factors (Burghardt 2005). I will come back to these factors when discussing 
reflective play.
It has been stated that most species play in a stereotyped manner and do 
not generate truly novel patterns. Nor do they engage in imaginary games such 
as pretend play and role playing, as do humans (Donald 2006). However, some 
scholars have pointed out that, on a cognitive level, pretend play should also be 
evident in nonhuman animals, especially in nonhuman great apes (chimpanzees, 
bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans), because they have the capacity to foresee and 
to contemplate alternative responses to environmental circumstances. Nonethe-
less, these researchers have also underlined that limited evidence exists for the 
capacity of these apes to operate in a pretend world, a capacity which involves 
holding in mind distinctions between the hypothetical (the imagined) and the 
real (the perceived) (Whiten and Suddendorf 2007). 
These researchers note that examples of pretend play in nonhuman great 
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apes lack frequency, richness, and complexity and appear only as relatively rare 
and fleeting signs of the necessary imaginative capacity rather than as an obvi-
ous everyday manifestation (Suddendorf and Whiten 2001). By contrast, other 
scholars point out that pretend play is a universal human trait (Smith 2010; 
Nielsen 2012; Lillard 2017), and that, by the time humans reach age four, they 
spend as much as one quarter of their free time pretending (Haight and Miller 
1992; Nielsen 2012). Here, I identify the unique features of cognition underlying 
pretend play, while embedding these unique features into the broader phyloge-
netic sources from which they have arisen.
Cognitive Capacities Are Not  
All-or-Nothing Phenomena
To explain which cognitive processes underlie the capacities to play and to pretend 
play and whether these processes are present in both humans and nonhuman 
animals, it is important to emphasize that, from the perspective of evolutionary 
biology, the difference between the cognitive processes of humans and nonhuman 
animals is one of degree and not of kind (Darwin 1871). Cognitive capacities are 
not all-or-nothing phenomena; they are found in varying degrees in a wide range 
of species. Every species comes with a set of evolutionarily ancient components 
of cognition that characterizes it and makes it unique (de Waal and Ferrari 2012). 
For this reason, instead of a hierarchy or sequence from so-called lower to higher 
animals, only organism-environment adaptations exist (Gould 1977).
A basic cognitive structure found in all living organisms, including bacteria, 
humans, and blue whales, consists of signal integration, memory, sensing/per-
ception, communication, behavior, learning, valence, and anticipation (Godfrey-
Smith 1996; Lyon 2015). This basic cognitive structure allows all organisms to 
adapt and survive in the complexity of their own environments. 
Specific signaling molecules have been conserved through millions of years 
of evolution and can be found today in both single-celled and multicellular 
organisms. Organisms such as worms, flies, and snails use the same molecules as 
humans to adjust to their environment. For example, with regard to memory, in 
humans as in many other multicellular organisms, the cellular basis of memory is 
neural. Thus, from studies conducted on the neural circuits of a type of large sea 
slug, we know the foundations of human memory—that repetition encourages 
consolidation; that, with repetition, the concentration of neurotransmitters in 
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synapses alters the strength of the existing connections between neurons; and 
that neurons grow new synaptic terminals (Kandel 1976, 2006).
In the case of perception, all organisms receive information through sens-
ing and process this information to initiate and guide behavior. For instance, 
insects, frogs, and birds respond to different wavelengths of light and sound 
with reference to their own biological affordances (Dissanayake 2015); rap-
tors react to tiny movements perceived many miles away (Metcalfe 2008); male 
bowerbirds gather brightly colored objects to attract mates (Endler 2012); and 
mammals, such as rats, cats, dogs, horses, and humans, respond emotionally 
to the perception of formal features of stimuli (Darwin 1872; Panksepp 1998). 
At first, imitative learning was thought to be characteristically human, 
a biological mechanism that could have brought about changes in behavior 
and cognition, enabling humans to save time, effort, and risk by exploiting the 
existing knowledge and skills of conspecifics (see Tomasello 1999). However, 
imitative learning has been proven to be widespread in the animal kingdom. It 
may be that all forms of imitation have a shared neural perception-action foun-
dation, from the vocal mimicry of birds to the copying of feeding techniques by 
primates (de Waal and Ferrari 2012). 
A shared basic cognitive structure has thus been widely studied, and clear 
evidence exists of its ubiquity in the animal kingdom. Degrees of memory, per-
ception, imagination, and consciousness seem therefore relevant to explaining 
the cognitive processes underlying the capacities to play and to pretend play. 
However, when it comes to the cognitive processes of imagination and con-
sciousness, less evidence seems to be available. 
The evolution of imagination seems closely linked to the evolution of 
memory retrieval mechanisms such as semantic memory (knowing), episodic 
memory (self-conscious remembering), and autobiographical memory (personal 
memories that appear repeatedly during one’s life) (see Schacter and Tulving 
1994; Tulving 2005). Based on this classification, Anna Abraham and Andreja 
Bubic (2015) propose semantic memory as the root of all aspects of human 
imagination. I have argued that reflective imagination emerges from and expands 
beyond episodic memory, which requires—but goes beyond—the semantic 
memory system (Wah 2019). 
A continuum between perception and imagination has also been suggested 
(Thomas 2014). George J. Romanes (1885) points out that imagination—the 
power of recalling, retaining, and manipulating mental images, no matter how 
rudimentary, provided that the mental images imply some dim idea of absent 
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objects or events—can be distinguished in four degrees in the animal king-
dom. Mollusca, insecta, arachnida, crustacea, cephalopoda (such as octopuses 
or squids) and vertebrata (such as fish or reptiles) can recall sensuous associa-
tions and retain the memory of a sensation without direct perception of objects 
and events. Hymenoptera (such as ants, bees, or wasps) and mammalia (such as 
foxes, wolves, or rabbits) can recall and retain mental images of absent objects 
and events suggested by other objects and events through a process of associa-
tion by contiguity. Birds (such as eagles, parrots, or canaries) and mammalia 
(such as cats, dogs, horses, elephants, or apes) can recall and retain mental 
images of absent objects and events independently of any obvious suggestion, 
as proven in their dreaming. However, recalling, retaining, and manipulating 
mental images with the set purpose of obtaining new combinations appears to 
be distinctively human.
The possibility to recall, retain, and manipulate mental patterns intention-
ally seems to require a distinctive degree of consciousness. Katherine Nelson 
(2005) emphasizes that consciousness has a cumulative and conservative charac-
ter and that it expands both in evolution and in development. She distinguishes 
six degrees of consciousness in humans, from awareness of feelings to extended 
states. These levels emerge during the first ten years of life, with implications 
for the development of the self and the social and cognitive functioning, and 
they seem to be reflected in its evolutionary trajectory. Nonhuman animals may 
evolve their own different levels of conscious awareness.
Degrees of consciousness have been distinguished in the animal kingdom. 
The first is core consciousness, the sense of the here and now that revolves 
around the core self.  The second is extended consciousness, which directs the 
autobiographical self and is self-reflective. Self-reflective consciousness con-
stitutes metacognition. Degrees of self, or the feeling of one’s own existence, 
have also been recognized: the nonconscious proto self, which characterizes 
deep sleep; the core self, which emerges in core consciousness; and the auto-
biographical self, which emerges in extended consciousness and is based on the 
experience of the integration of the here and now (perception) with the lived 
past (memory) and the anticipated future (imagination) —the so-called mental 
time travel (Damasio 1999, 2003, 2010, 2011; Metcalfe 2008). 
To understand the capacity for mental time travel, Janet Metcalfe and Lisa 
K. Son have made a further distinction between anoetic, noetic and autonoetic 
consciousness. Anoetic consciousness is a state related to implicit memory and 
is temporally and spatially bound to the present, which means that judgments 
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are related to stimuli in actual perception. Noetic consciousness is a state that is 
associated with semantic memory and involves internal representations regard-
ing past facts and general knowledge, which means that judgments are related 
to recalled stimuli. This form of consciousness does not necessarily involve the 
autobiographical self. Finally, autonoetic consciousness is a self-reflective state 
that involves episodic memory, which means that judgments make specific refer-
ence to the self, allowing one to recall a personal past and to imagine a personal 
future, thereby making mental time travel possible (Tulving 1985; Metcalfe and 
Son 2012). Based on this classification, I will come back to degrees of memory, 
perception, imagination, and consciousness when discussing perceptual play, 
reflective play, and reflective imaginative play. But first what do we know about 
the presence of mental time travel in nonhuman animals? 
Phylogeny of Mental Time Travel
The possibility that nonhuman animals are endowed with the ability to recall 
their own past and imagine their own future has raised wide debate and contro-
versy. According to Endel Tulving (2005) and Thomas Suddendorf and Michael 
C. Corballis (2007), mental time travel is the human ability to project oneself 
in time and implies episodic memory, episodic future planning, and autono-
etic consciousness. These accounts echo the Bischof–Köhler hypothesis (1985) 
suggesting nonhuman animals are stuck in the present time. However, since 
episodic memory and episodic future planning rely on self-reporting, it is dif-
ficult to devise tests to assess whether nonhuman animals have such abilities 
(Ferretti et al. 2017). 
Francesco Ferretti and colleagues (2017) discuss several of the compara-
tive studies on mental time travel conducted over the past two decades. Some 
of the more comprehensive behavioral data on episodic memory have come 
from studies of birds making use of the “what-where-when” paradigm created 
in reference to Tulving’s (1972) early conceptualization of episodic memory. 
Clayton and colleagues (1998; 2001; 2003) have tested the caching behavior and 
memory ability of western scrub jays. According to these researchers, that these 
birds remember what food items they cache, where, and when they cache them 
indicates they have episodic memory and episodic future planning. 
Related experiments conducted with rats obtained similar results. Electro-
encephalography (EEG) has indicated neural activity in the rat hippocampus 
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when the animal explores a maze, suggesting that the hippocampus is involved 
in the construction and activation of cognitive maps. Such activity has also been 
observed in sharp-wave ripples (SWRs) after a rat has been through a maze, 
either during slow-wave sleep or when the animal is awake but immobile. Some-
times the replayed path does not correspond to the route the rat actually takes, 
which suggests the anticipation of future navigations of the maze and means that 
the cognitive map extends beyond actual experience (Zhou and Crystal 2009; 
Lu et al. 2012). The evidence that neural activity in the hippocampal regions 
corresponds to future navigation in rats seems to indicate subjective experience 
and raises the possibility of a more phylogenetically continuous view of episodic 
future planning in mammals (Corballis 2013).
Studies on nonhuman great apes have also shown that they could pass the 
Bischof–Köhler test. For instance, chimpanzees have been reported to select and 
manufacture tools appropriate to future activity and to pick up suitable materi-
als in advance of a need, sometimes out of sight of the place of use. They have 
been observed carrying stones to nut-cracking sites—even when the sites were 
not within view—or manufacturing probes for termite fishing from one termite 
nest to another (Goodall 1964; Boesch and Boesch 1984). Foresight abilities in 
bonobos and orangutans have also been tested using the methodological setting 
of Tulving’s spoon test, and subsequent studies have replicated and extended 
these findings (Mulcahy and Call 2006; Osvath and Osvath 2008; Osvath 2009). 
All this evidence suggests that these degrees of experience are not human 
language-mediated processes as previously thought and that memory, percep-
tion, imagination, and consciousness are found in varying degrees in a wide 
range of species, including birds and mammals. Thus, de Waal and Ferrari (2012)
were correct in pointing out that even if humans build cathedrals and produce 
symphonies this offers no reason to place them beyond comparison, because 
their underlying processes—such as social learning, coordination, tool use, and 
sense of rhythm—are shared with other animals. However, the question here 
is which cognitive processes and to what degree they underlie the capacities to 
build cathedrals and produce symphonies or—more specifically for our pur-
poses—to play and pretend play. 
Risks of Comparative Studies
Comparative theories of cognition have progressed because we now know 
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more about brain evolution. For instance, we can now debunk a well- 
established but mistaken assumption that the neocortex is a recent mam-
malian invention and that the so-called triune brain consists of the reptilian 
complex, the paleomammalian complex, and the neomammalian complex (see 
MacLean 1964). Even though the notion of an ancestral reptilian brain pres-
ent in mammals, including humans, has been difficult to abandon, we know 
now that lizards, crocodiles, and birds are close cousins and all considered to 
be reptiles and that reptiles evolved along a different evolutionary path than 
mammals (Herculano-Houzel 2016). 
Comparing humans with other mammals, more specifically with other 
great apes: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes and Pan schweinfurthii), bonobos (Pan 
paniscus), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), remains, 
therefore, one of the more efficient and effective approaches to understanding 
human cognition (Pellegrini and Smith 2005). However, comparative studies 
risk masking six million years of an evolution that divides humans from other 
great apes. Even though the human family tree nests within that of the great apes, 
humans’ closest living relatives cannot be used as “living fossils,” because their 
lines have also evolved (Gurche 2013). Comparative studies also risk overlook-
ing that these six million years are filled by multiple hominin species other than 
Homo sapiens (Nielsen 2012). Human cognition has not evolved in a simple 
linear manner, nor has it evolved in isolation but together with anatomy, diet, 
mating behavior, social life, and energy generation and consumption (Donald 
1991, 2013). 
Nonetheless, similarities in DNA show that chimpanzees and bonobos are 
the closest phylogenetic relatives to humans (Wrangham et al. 1996). Chim-
panzees and bonobos have been posited as especially informative comparator 
species (McGrew 1981; de Waal and Lanting 1997). Cross-primate compari-
sons do remain useful because the functional anatomy of the primate brain 
has changed very slowly, and the basic brain design of humans remains close 
to that of other primates. Moreover, there is a significant overlap between 
their behavioral repertoires. The range of social cognitive behaviors avail-
able to humans clearly derives from equivalent behaviors in other primates 
(Donald 2013). 
Thus, mindful of the risks involved in comparative studies and based on the 
previous theoretical framework, I now compare the play behaviors of humans 
and nonhuman great apes and distinguish between perceptual play, reflective 
play, and reflective imaginative play.
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Perceptual Play
Locomotor-rotational play, also called exercise play, appears to be the origi-
nal form of mammalian play. This type of play maintains neural develop-
ment, motor control, and physical fitness and stamina (Byers and Walker 
1995). Social play, including rough-and-tumble play, also constitutes a com-
mon mammalian behavior, although different species vary in the nature and 
frequency with which they engage in such play. This type of play has been 
linked to the growth of the cerebellum and neocortex (Lewis 2004; 2005). All 
nonhuman great apes show varied locomotor-rotational play and social play 
patterns (Pellegrini and Smith 2005). 
Angeline Lillard (2017) suggests that a form of social play, play fighting, 
can be regarded as an analog of pretend play. She argues that in both cases meta-
communication plays a fundamental role, as both play fighting and pretend play 
are issued as if they were real behaviors. There seems indeed to be continuity 
between social play and pretend play. However, the presence of social play in 
the so-called mother-infant interaction in humans suggests that, unlike pretend 
play, social play is an evolved predisposition that is unintentional in both baby 
and adult, and therefore does not require metacognition.
During human infancy, memory is nonconscious or implicit. This means 
that memory is evoked and instrumental but not reflective or accessible to vol-
untary recall. The phenomenon of infantile amnesia is attributed to this lack of 
memory rehearsal and undeveloped cognitive self (Nelson and Fivush 2000, 
2004; Nelson 2005). Babies cannot manage more than one mental pattern at a 
time (Lucariello 2004). They do not yet have a conception of past and future, 
nor the capacity to understand another’s perspective (Nelson 2005). 
Ellen Dissanayake (2000, 2001, 2015) explains how the affiliative vocal-
izations, facial expressions, and head and body movements of the adult in the 
mother-infant interaction are transformed into attention-getting signals by the 
process of ritualization. The function of these communicative signals is to attract 
and sustain the attention of the infant and to trigger emotion, helping the infant 
achieve homeostatic equilibrium and emotional regulation. It is with reading 
emotions that mental mind travel begins (Corballis 2011). The tendency in 
adults to produce spontaneously these behavioral patterns and the sensitivities 
of newborns to reciprocate them suggest their primal importance (Wah 2019).
Play behaviors such as locomotor-rotational play, social play, and some 
examples of object play—such as manipulating branches and leaves, biting a toy, 
 Cognitive Processes Underlying Play and Pretend Play 165
or dropping a ball—show that perception plays a dominant role (Mitchell 2002). 
That these play behaviors are underlain by perception-action and are therefore 
temporally and spatially bound to the present, suggests that for these forms of 
play no metacognition or inward-directed attention is necessary. Anoetic con-
sciousness and implicit memory seem to be sufficient. Evidence of these types 
of play can be found in all great apes including typically developing human 
infants and children younger than two years of age. We can refer to this type of 
play as perceptual play.
Reflective Play
Object play appears rarely in mammalian species but relatively commonly among 
great apes (Smith and Pellegrini 2005). Object play emerges early in human 
ontogeny. Babies endlessly repeat and rehearse the activities of reaching, grasp-
ing, and investigating with their eyes, hands, and mouths and begin to learn 
how things in the world look, sound, smell, feel, and taste (Dissanayake 2000). 
The first level of experiential awareness in human infants is that of a self, one 
that distinguishes the boundary between self and other. Midway in the first 
year, this boundary extends to a relation between self, other, and object (Nelson 
2005). This means that the beginning of the understanding of space precedes 
the understanding of time (Corballis 2011). The ability for mental space travel 
is a property of semantic memory and a precondition for mental time travel 
(Tulving 2005). 
In typical development, the first recognition of the self appears near the 
end of the second year, once a young child passes the mirror test (the ability to 
recognize that one’s image reflected in a mirror belongs to oneself). The cogni-
tive self marks the beginning of memory as a recursive or metacognitive phe-
nomenon (Tulving 2005; Corballis 2011). This ability hinges on the capacity to 
keep in mind two different mental patterns at the same time and is based on the 
development of representational systems or mappings (Bjorklund 2012). This 
cognitive capacity has also been demonstrated in several mammals including 
all nonhuman great apes, because they have all passed the mirror test (Plotnik 
et al. 2010; de Waal and Ferrari 2012). 
Toward the end of the second year, typically developing human children 
begin to apply their knowledge to symbolically manipulate objects; an empty 
cup, for example, may be “sipped” from as if it contains hot liquid (Leslie 1987; 
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Harris 2000; Nielsen 2012). Children begin to handle and manipulate artifacts 
with increasing coordination and goal orientation, and they gradually become 
able to imagine their actions have an effect on objects and on others (Dissanay-
ake 2000).
Some documented cases suggest pretend play occurs in nonhuman great 
apes reared by humans in a largely human environment. For instance, chim-
panzee Viki briefly played with an imaginary pull toy (Hayes 1951); chimpanzee 
Washoe washed a doll in water in a bathtub and chimpanzee Austin used an 
imaginary spoon to eat food from an imaginary plate (Gómez and Martín-
Andrade 2005); gorilla Koko made slurping sounds while “drinking” from 
an empty cup (Patterson 1980; Matevia, Patterson, and Hillix 2002); bonobo 
Kanzi hid and ate imaginary food (Savage-Rumbaugh 1986); and, while sleep-
ing, orangutans in the wild held a leaf bundle compared to a doll by the authors 
(van Schaik et al. 2003). Nonetheless, these accounts of play behaviors hardly 
develop into role play, sociodramatic play, or narrative sequences (Smith 2010). 
Clear parallels can be observed between the examples of object play in 
human children ages fifteen months to two years and juvenile nonhuman great 
apes. Both involve imitative abilities and actions such as eating, drinking, and 
cuddling a “baby.” It is important to point out that these actions do not require 
a full symbolic capacity. Although they are a stepping-stone to full symbolic 
pretend play, these forms of play often overlap with object play (Gómez and 
Martín-Andrade 2005; Smith and Pellegrini 2005). 
Play behaviors such as the imitation of one’s own or another’s actions are 
based on the capacity to reenact perceived or recalled objects and events and can 
be classified as expressions of metacognition. This suggests that, for these forms 
of play, noetic consciousness and semantic memory are necessary. Evidence of 
these types of play is found in juvenile great apes, including typically developing 
human children older than fifteen-months to two years of age. We can refer to 
this type of play as reflective play. 
Reflective Imaginative Play
The development of cognition in humans becomes evident around the third year, 
with considerable advances in episodic memory. These advances in episodic 
memory add to the ability to mental space travel the ability to mental time travel, 
not only into the past but, more important, also into the future (Tulving 2005). 
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In this period, children begin to reflect upon their experiences (or potential 
experiences), distinguishing between past, present, and future, and they can 
begin to follow a storyline (Tulving 1985; Suddendorf and Corballis 1997, 2007; 
Terrace and Metcalfe 2005; Nelson 2005; Ferretti et al. 2017). Through narratives, 
children imagine others’ behaviors into internally coherent accounts. Narratives 
provide a resource for linking otherwise isolated events into causal, chronologi-
cal wholes (Herman 2013; Ferretti et al. 2017). 
Just as human children naturally start to dance, sing, mime, and draw, 
they also begin to engage in make-believe (Dissanayake 2000; Wah 2019). The 
spontaneous interaction of imitation turns into deliberate imitation as simula-
tion or pretense (Dissanayake 2001). Pretend play invariably involves doing “as 
if ” objects, oneself, or others were something else and had different meanings. 
It therefore invariably involves the use of imagination (Goldman 1998; Thomas 
2014). Pretending “as if ” is constrained in its themes and targets and involves 
pretending that one common object is more interesting than another, pretend-
ing that a person-like object is animated, pretending to be different animals, 
and later pretending various social roles and acting them out. All these features 
constitute a form of training for imaginative mind-reading capacities (Boyer 
2007; Taylor, Carlson, and Shawber 2007).
Human children continue developing mental mind travel—the imagina-
tive capacity to predict, take another’s viewpoint, and understand their own and 
others’ mental states, such as thoughts, feelings, actions, and intentions (Currie 
1995; Thomas 2003; Damasio 2010). The capacity to retain and compare mul-
tiple mental patterns underlies this imaginative skill and increases dramatically 
between ages five and eleven (Goswami 2008). The capacity to imagine oneself 
or others in a different space, time, and mental state has a very important func-
tion in learning and the transmission of knowledge. The cognitive capacities 
for mental space travel, mental time travel, and mental mind travel underlying 
reflective imagination can become fully present in late childhood (Wah 2019).
Lillard (1994) has defined pretense as requiring a pretender, a reality, and 
a mental representation that the pretender projects onto reality with awareness 
and intention. According to Peter Smith (2010), this implies conscious intention 
and an awareness of both the actual reality and the pretend reality and, thus, 
some metarepresentational ability. This would rule out most nonhuman pretense. 
The examples of play in nonhuman great apes suggest no awareness of pretense, 
nor an intention to pretend or deceive (Mitchell 2007; Smith 2010). Adopting 
this definition also rules out pretend play in human infants and young children. 
168 A M E R I C A N  J O U R N A L  O F  P L A Y  •  W I N T E R  2 0 2 0
Pretend play therefore provides the greatest discontinuity between non-
human great apes and humans. It seems to depend on symbolic capacities 
attained only by human children, as demonstrated in children three to four 
years old (Smith and Pellegrini 2005). In pretend play, one can step back from 
reality, a cognitive capacity that allows one, among other things, to be absorbed 
with the experience of stories (Harris 2000). By contrast, in nonhuman great apes 
there seems to be no evidence of narrative consciousness or of understanding 
anything like a story (Nelson 2005). This does not mean that nonhuman animals 
are incapable of complex and sophisticated forms of communication, but it does 
mean that one cannot accredit them storytelling skills (Ferretti et al. 2017). 
Play behaviors that include the delayed imitation of one’s own or another’s 
actions depend on the capacity to reenact or re-create objects and events that 
are imagined instead of only perceived or recalled. This suggests that, for these 
forms of play, distinctive degrees of imagination and metacognition, inward-
directed attention, episodic memory, and episodic future planning are necessary. 
Evidence of this type of play with specific reference to the self has not been found 
in nonhuman great apes but is found in typically developing human children 
older than three to four years of age. We can refer to this type of play as reflec-
tive imaginative play.
Possible Functions of Pretend Play 
A predictable developmental sequence of pretend play and its universality in 
humans suggest an evolved behavior (Lillard 2017). Until the 1970s, the impor-
tance of pretend play was assumed without direct empirical evidence or con-
trolled experimental studies. Nonetheless, in recent decades, several theorists 
have argued the benefits of pretend play for cognitive development, creative 
thinking, and creative problem solving (see Smith 2004; Pellegrini, Dupuis, 
and Smith 2007). 
Pretending seems to allow humans to develop the skill to generate and 
reason with novel suppositions and imaginary scenarios, thereby practicing 
the creative process that underpins innovation (Harris and Kavanaugh 1993; 
Carruthers 2002, 2006; Rakoczy 2008; Nielsen 2012). Pretend play also appears 
to serve a self-regulatory function, including emotional regulation (Singer and 
Singer 1990; Dissanayake 2000; Scarlett 2004). It has also been argued that pre-
tend play confers on humans a vast array of skills, enabling them to construct 
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and adapt to rules and meanings, and transmit knowledge (Nielsen 2012). More 
recently it has also been stated that the sensitivity to read social signals in the 
presentation of reality on two levels appears to enable symbolic interpretation 
of behavior (Lillard 2017).
Smith (2010) points out that pretend play is a characteristically juvenile 
form of human behavior that generally shows an inverted U curve of frequency 
in adults. Lillard (2017) even suggests that pretend play stops at about the age of 
eleven. Nonetheless, memory enhancement continues in adolescence marked by 
major developments in autobiographical memory. Episodic memory combined 
with aspects of semantic memory makes up what is known as autobiographical 
memory (Corballis 2011). This means that imagination does not vanish after 
childhood, but merely becomes more private (Singer and Singer 1990). 
As children become more self-conscious, they begin to replace pretend play 
with daydreaming and fantasy (Singer and Singer 1990). The development of 
metacognition or inward-directed attention in adolescence, adulthood, and senes-
cence makes reflective imagination more challenging to study, because its products 
become less accessible to direct observation—unless externalized. Even if reflective 
imagination becomes more private after late childhood, it will continue to develop 
and to play a crucial role in the adaptation to the environment (Wah 2019).
Cognitive Processes Underlying Play and Pretend Play
Mental travel appears to be tied in nonhuman animals—including nonhuman 
great apes—to the capacity to foresee and to contemplate alternative responses 
to their environmental circumstances, such as particular locations. By contrast, 
the mental travel present in humans includes not only the imagination of dif-
ferent spatial locations (mental space travel), but also distinctive degrees of the 
imagination of oneself or others at different times (mental time travel), and 
mental states (mental mind travel), giving rise to unlimited possible combina-
tions (Corballis 2013; Wah 2019).
For better or for worse, the positive outcome of this cognitive capacity in 
humans is that it confers the abilities to escape being stimulus bound, that is, 
to project oneself outside the boundaries of one’s immediate environment to 
foresee and evaluate personal events beforehand, to take another’s viewpoint, 
and to reflect upon and modify one’s own behaviors and actions. However, the 
negative outcome is that this cognitive capacity also brings about in humans 
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doubts about what they perceive, about meanings, and about intentions, thereby 
making human life an uncertain affair (Metcalfe 2008; van Heusden 2009; Dis-
sanayake 2009).
Humans do not only focus on the environment but also internally on 
action itself. Self-inward attention allows humans to focus in detail on their 
own actions, to evaluate them, and to reenact or re-create them on the basis of 
an imagined idea through rehearsal of skill, mime, and nonlinguistic gestures. 
Metacognition (self-reflective consciousness) and event representation (imagi-
nation) seem the neuro-cognitive mechanisms that made hominins capable of 
symbolic processing (Donald 1991, 2001, 2006, 2013). The distinctive degrees 
of memory, imagination, and metacognition present in humans appear to make 
possible the narrative capacity underlying pretend play. This narrative capacity 
seems to be the antecedent of verbal language (see Donald 1991; Boyd 2009; 
Zlatev 2014; Corballis 2015; Ferretti et al. 2017). 
It is important to mention that most published studies on the play behaviors 
of nonhuman great apes focus on their juvenile stage and lack adequate infor-
mation to test hypotheses of ontogenetic processes. Still needed are normative 
and comparative studies between nonhuman great apes, both in the wild and in 
captivity (Ramsey and McGrew 2005). For now, we know that neither rehearsal 
of skill in terms of innovation, mime in terms of reenaction or re-creation of 
imagined objects and events, nonlinguistic gesture in terms of pantomime, nor 
symbolic invention in terms of imposing different meanings to objects and 
events are prevalent or present in the play behaviors of nonhuman great apes 
or other nonhuman animals. 
Drawing on the available evidence, pretend play, in contrast to play, seems 
characteristically human and underlain by distinctive degrees of memory, imagina-
tion, and metacognition, the cognitive process I refer to as reflective imagination 
(Wah 2017, 2019).  This reflective imaginative ability is the one that seems to enable 
humans to save time, effort, and risk by exploiting the existing knowledge and 
skills of conspecifics, as well as to have evolved, and to develop, into the abstract 
thought and analysis necessary for building cathedrals and producing symphonies.
Conclusion
In this article I have investigated which cognitive processes underlie the capaci-
ties to play and to pretend play and whether these processes are present in 
 Cognitive Processes Underlying Play and Pretend Play 171
both humans and nonhuman animals. My aim in conducting this compara-
tive cross-species study has been to shed light on basic processes and common 
denominators before exploring species-typical specializations. Bearing in mind 
that cognitive capacities are not all-or-nothing phenomena but are to be found 
in varying degrees in a wide range of species—and that risks are involved in 
comparative studies—I have argued that play is underlain by particular degrees 
of memory, perception, and consciousness and may be found in many species, 
whereas pretend play is underlain by distinctive degrees of memory, imagina-
tion, and metacognition. This latter, a cognitive process that I refer to as reflec-
tive imagination, seems to be characteristically human. Pointing out that the 
phenomenon of pretend play appears to be typically human and dependent on 
distinctive degrees of memory, imagination, and metacognition is important, 
because this helps us understand its possible adaptive functions. I find it thus 
worth reconsidering the role the reflective imagination has played and still plays 
in both human evolution and human development.
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